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After a ten day separation from his family, Osvaldo Conde
knocked on Margarita Montero's bedroom window in the early hours
of June 29th. Because Conde had been away, the children were
sleeping in the bedroom with Ms. Montero. Lourdes accompanied
Ms. Montero as she opened the front door to admit Conde into the
home. He followed them back to the bedroom where Lourdes imme-
diately returned to bed. Conde stood to the right of the room (next to
the door) with Ms. Montero standing to the left. Conde pulled the
gun and, after stating "I'm tired of everything" or "I have come to
end it all," shot Ms. Montero through the chest. He then shot
Lourdes in her side as she lay in bed and finally shot Rolddy through
the head. He saw Ms. Montero leaving the bedroom and shot her,
with his last bullet, through her back. When she didn't fall, Conde hit
her in the head with a bottle stating, "The children are already dead;
why do you want to be alive?" Finally, he started "to press on [her]
neck" as the police arived.'
When Ms. Montero sued the man who had shot her children, shot
her twice, and then beat and choked her, she alleged negligence. She
also alleged intentional harm, but the critical claim was negligence.
That claim triggered Conde's insurance coverage.2
The events leading up to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Conde,3 stated
above, are heart-wrenching. The events also clearly resulted from the
intentional acts of Osvaldo Conde. Montero alleged negligence, though,
1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted). This case is discussed in detail infra part III.
2. Id. at 1005-06.
3. Id. at 1005.
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because she wanted to recover under Conde's insurance policy, and
insurance policies exclude coverage for injuries intentionally caused by
the insured.
Because Osvaldo Conde's actions were intentional, the resulting
claims were clearly excluded from insurance coverage. The Conde case,
which involved the intentional act exclusion, is the paradigm of a prob-
lematic type of insurance case. In such cases, an injured party brings an
action against the insured alleging a covered claim, when in fact the
claim is not covered by the policy. If the insurer is not permitted to
prove that the claim is excluded from coverage, then it faces the cost of
defending the "negligence" action and, possibly, a subsequent suit to
resolve coverage. Faced with this prospect, the insurer may find it eco-
nomically expedient to settle with the injured party quickly, despite a
good faith objection or coverage defense.
The declaratory judgment action is one tool that insurers can use to
determine which claims fall outside of coverage. In Conde, the insurer,
arguing that it was not liable to defend or indemnify Conde, brought a
declaratory action.4 Whether an insurer should be allowed to bring such
an action to determine its duties regarding coverage has been a matter of
disagreement in Florida.5 Many cases have held that the insurer may not
bring a declaratory action until liability in the underlying tort action has
been decided. In other cases, including Conde, the courts have allowed
such actions.
On the surface, the debate in these cases seems to revolve around
timing-at what stage of the proceedings an insurer may bring a declar-
atory judgment action over coverage defenses. But in reality the debate
is more fundamental. The debate involves the manner in which Florida
courts determine the insurer's duties, particularly the duty to defend.
This Comment describes that debate, and proposes a rule for
declaratory judgment actions that would allow insurers to challenge fic-
tional negligence claims while protecting the rights of the insured. Part I
describes the insurer's duties under an insurance policy in Florida. It
addresses the duty to defend, as well as the treatment of claims outside
of coverage. Part II briefly describes the declaratory judgment action as
one of the insurer's options. Part III outlines the use of the declaratory
judgment for insurance claims under Florida law, including the recent
split of authority among the Florida District Courts of Appeal. Part IV
describes the debate over whether the declaratory judgment action may
proceed before the underlying liability has been determined. Part V pro-
poses a method for using the declaratory judgment to allow the parties to
4. Id.
5. See infra part M.D.
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determine their rights early in litigation, in order to maximize judicial
efficiency in Florida's courts.
I. DUTIES OF THE LIABILITY INSURER
Although liability insurance is available for many different types of
coverage, 6 this Comment primarily addresses the insurer's duties in con-
nection with Commercial General Liability coverage7 and Homeowners'
Liability coverage. In exchange for a premium, the issuer of a standard
liability insurance policy makes two promises to the insured. First, the
insurer promises to indemnify the insured for any amounts that the
insured becomes obligated to pay for covered losses up to the policy
limits. Second, the insurer promises to defend the insured if such a
claim develops into a lawsuit.' These two promises are known, respec-
tively, as the "duty to indemnify" and the "duty to defend." The insurer
is obligated to perform these duties only for claims that come within
6. One commentator noted a "very abridged list" which included: accountants' liability,
advertising liability, architects' liability, comprehensive general liability, contractors' liability,
contractual liability exposure, dentists' professional liability, fiduciary liability, hospital liability,
homeowners' liability, lawyers' professional liability, liquor liability, physicians' and surgeons'
professional liability, pollution liability, products' liability, and storekeepers' liability. Alan I.
Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of Liability Insurers to Defend Their Insureds: The Case
for Separating the Obligation to Indemnify from the Defense of Insureds, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 917,
917 n.2 (1990).
7. Known prior to 1986 as Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, Commercial General
Liability ("CGL") insurance was developed in the 1940s to allow insureds to combine many types
of third-party insurance, including bodily injury, personal injury, advertising liability, and fire
liability coverage, into one policy. EDWARD J. ZULKEY, BUSINESS LIABILITY INSURANCE:
LITIGATION, ARBITRATION, AND SETTrLEMENT § 1.08 & n.113 (1994). It is offered to businesses
that do not engage in activity presenting unique risks or valuation problems. Cf. Widiss, supra
note 6, at 917 (enumerating specific types of liability insurance).
8. In the 1950s insurers developed the homeowners' policy by incorporating several kinds of
first-party property coverages into one package. One element of this package is third-party
comprehensive personal liability coverage. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 267 (1987). The liability coverage generally provides that the insurer will pay for damages
up to the limit of liability for which the insured is legally liable, and will provide a defense, even if
the suit is "groundless, false or fraudulent." See 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE,
MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 411 (1995) (sample Commercial General
Liability insurance policy).
9. For example, one typical form policy says:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall
have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on
account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent ....
M11.ER & LEFEBVE, supra note 8, at 411.
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policy coverage.' 0
The insurer's duties are not coextensive. The duty to defend is gen-
erally considered to be both broader and more difficult to determine than
the duty to indemnify. The traditional explanation for this difference is
timing." Whereas the duty to indemnify is determined after the facts
have been established, the duty to defend is determined at the com-
mencement of the lawsuit, before the facts have been established.
Determining the duty to indemnify is fairly straightforward. If a
claim falls within the coverage of the policy and the insured is legally
obligated to pay, the insurer must indemnify the insured up to the policy
limits. Determining the duty to defend is not as simple, because the
facts will not have been established when the defense begins, so the
insurer must decide whether to undertake the defense by prospectively
analyzing whether the claim might come within coverage. 12 One com-
mentator has suggested that it is better to think of the duty to defend as
being keyed to "coverage," rather than "liability," since even a ground-
less claim triggers the duty to defend if the claim would fall within cov-
erage.' 3 He suggests that as a general rule where "the insurer has a duty
to defend any lawsuit against its insured where, if liability were later
established, the insurer would be required to pay damages on behalf of
the insured." 4
A. The Duty to Defend
There are two basic tests to determine the duty to defend: the
"exclusive pleading" test, and the "factual" or "potentiality" test. Both
begin by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the language
of the policy. The language of the duty-to-defend clause compels this
analysis, as the clause promises to defend "any suit ... seeking dam-
ages""5 covered by the policy. To determine the damages a plaintiff is
seeking one must look to the complaint.
10. Liability policies contain "exclusions" from coverage, for which the insurance does not
apply. Damages which the insured intentionally caused are always excluded. CGL policies
contain many other exclusions, such as dram shop liability, pollution damage, and workers'
compensation. ZULKEY, supra note 7, § 1.08.
11. See James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich
Insurance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
141, 142 (1991).
12. Id. at 143. Professor Fischer supported the policy of treating the duty to defend as
broader than the duty to indemnify, but criticized the timing explanation as insufficient. Id. at
142-43. He suggested several public policy reasons for placing the broader duty to defend upon
insurers. Id. at 181-83.
13. JERRY, supra note 8, at 562.
14. Id. (emphasis omitted).
15. See supra note 9 for standard policy language.
[Vol. 50:945
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The difference between the tests is whether the parties may con-
sider facts extrinsic to the complaint to determine the duty to defend.
The "exclusive pleading" test holds that "the insurer's duty to defend
depends solely on the scope of the allegations against the insured."' 6
Justice Learned Hand described this test in Lee v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,' 7 in which the court stated:
This language means that the insurer will defend the suit, if the
injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury "cov-
ered" by the policy; it is the claim which determines the insurer's
duty to defend; and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get informa-
tion from the insured, or from any one else, which indicates, or even
demonstrates, that the injury is not in fact "covered."' 8
Because the insurer promises to defend against even "groundless, false,
or fraudulent" claims, when such a claim is asserted the insurer must
undertake the defense and dismiss the action on the merits, rather than
refuse to defend on the basis that the claim actually falls outside of
coverage.' 9
The other approach, called the "factual"20 or "potentiality" test,2
requires an insurer to defend if the claims may come within coverage,
even if the complaint does not clearly allege coverage. "[I]t extends the
duty to defend to asserted claims outside coverage based on the prospect
that unasserted claims within coverage may be brought against the
insured."22 This test requires insurers to examine the facts indepen-
dently and determine whether covered claims could be asserted. One
court even implied that the insurer should investigate extrinsic facts to
determine whether it must defend, stating, "Where the insurer knows or
could reasonably ascertain facts that, if proven, would be covered by its
policy, the duty to defend is not dismissed because the facts alleged in a
third-party complaint appear to be outside coverage, or within a policy
exception to coverage. '"23
The potentiality test also addresses the possibility that asserted
claims that seem to be outside of coverage are actually within coverage.
This not only requires insurers to defend asserted claims that are within
16. David S. Garbett, Comment, The Duty to Defend Clause in a Liability Insurance Policy:
Should the Exclusive Pleading Test Be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 235, 240 (1982).
17. 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
18. Id. at 751.
19. See, e.g., Marr Invs., Inc. v. Greco, 621 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
20. Garbett, supra note 16, at 238.
21. Fischer, supra note 11, at 156.
22. Id. at 157; see Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (in bank)
(describing the California version of the potentiality test).
23. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 377 (N.C.
1986) (emphasis added).
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coverage, i.e., claims that meet the exclusive pleading test, but also
requires insurers to defend if there is any possibility that the asserted
claims may come within coverage.2 4
Many courts25 and commentators 26 have stated that if the complaint
alleges a claim within coverage, the insurer may not use extrinsic facts
to avoid its obligation to defend. This conclusion follows from the pol-
icy language, in which the insurer agrees to defend "groundless" suits.
Some argue that under the potentiality test, the extrinsic facts can oper-
ate only as a "one-way ratchet," in that an insurer's knowledge may
bring a poorly pleaded claim into coverage, but will not excuse the
insurer from defending a claim which has alleged coverage.27
Florida purports to follow the "exclusive pleading" test, whereby an
insurer's duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint.28
Under Florida law, the duty to defend is "distinct from and broader
than" the duty to indemnify.29 If a complaint alleges some claims which
are within coverage and some claims outside of coverage, the question
of defense must be resolved in favor of the insured, and the insurer must
provide a defense for the entire action °.3  If the original complaint does
24. See, e.g., Town Crier, Inc. v. Hume, 721 F. Supp. 99, 102 (E.D. Va. 1989); Technicon
Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (N.Y. 1989).
25. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (in bank); Afcan v. Mutual Fire,
Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska 1979); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Janson, 377
N.E.2d 296 (I11. App. 1978). But see Linebaugh v. Berdish, 376 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (allegation of negligence in case of sexual assault of 14-year-old girl did not trigger duty to
defend because the allegation was "a transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage" by
characterizing excluded conduct as negligent).
26. JERRY, supra note 8, at 565; see also Fischer, supra note 11; Garbett, supra note 16; Note,
Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend: American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold
Storage Co., 30 ME. L. REv. 295 (1979).
27. Fischer, supra note 11, at 152. But see Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ivy Liquors, Inc.,
185 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (where the allegations of the complaint did not fall within
coverage, but insurer assumed the defense and subsequently conducted an investigation, the
insurer properly withdrew from the defense without waiving its coverage defenses when the
investigation demonstrated that no coverage existed); ROBERT E. KEETON, BASic TExT ON
IN URANCE LAW 466-68 (1971) (arguing that if an insurer can prove that an allegation necessary
for coverage, such as whether the defendant is an insured under the policy, is false or unclear, the
insurer should be relieved of the duty to defend).
Whether limiting the "ratchet" to only one direction is the best solution will be discussed
further supra part IV.
28. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1977);
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Edgecumbe, 471 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (error
for trial judge to consider testimony from declaratory judgment action in determining the duty to
defend, because the allegations of the complaint control); Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co., 357 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
29. See also Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 810, 813 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985); Marr lnvs., Inc. v. Greco, 621 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Grissom v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
30. Grissom, 610 So. 2d at 1307; Baron Oil, 470 So. 2d at 813-14; Tropical Park, 357 So. 2d
at 256.
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not allege claims within coverage, but the insured amends the pleadings
to allege such claims, then upon notification the insurance carrier is
obliged to provide a defense.3'
While the emphasis that Florida courts place upon the allegations in
the complaint suggest that Florida follows the "exclusive pleading" test,
the matter is not so straightforward. In Tropical Park, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,32 the court stated that the complaint
must allege facts which 'fairly bring the cause within the coverage of
the insurance contract even though ultimately there is no liability. '33
The case involved an injury to a person who was described in the com-
plaint as a "free-lance jockey" but was actually an exercise boy. The
policy excluded coverage for injury to persons practicing for any athletic
contest.34 After the exercise boy was injured and brought an action
against the park, the insurer refused to defend the park. 35 The District
Court of Appeal held that the mistaken allegation that the exercise boy
was a jockey did not place the claim within the exclusion, and the com-
plaint "fairly" brought the claims within coverage, therefore the insurer
was obliged to defend the action. 36 Thus the court looked to the com-
plaint to determine the duty to defend, but the court found a duty to
defend by reading the complaint expansively, which seems more like the
potentiality test. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
applied this expansive reading in two decisions that cited Tropical Park.
In Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Construction Co.,37 the court
stated, "Because the complaint alleges facts 'which fairly bring the
cause within the coverage of the insurance contract,' ... there is a poten-
tial for coverage" and the insurer must defend the action .3  Later, in
Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n v. State Farm General Insur-
ance Co.,3 9 the court stated, "The insurer must defend when the com-
plaint alleges facts which fairly and potentially bring the suit within
policy coverage. '"40
Thus, although in Florida the insurer's duty to defend is determined
from the complaint, courts will look for potential coverage in the allega-
tions. "If, when applying the 'exclusive pleadings' test, a court may
31. Baron Oil, 470 So. 2d at 814-15; C.A. Fielland, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y.,
297 So. 2d 122, 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
32. 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
33. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 255.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 257.
37. 767 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
39. 980 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 1405 (emphasis added).
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indulge in the most liberal interpretation of the allegations to which they
are susceptible, then the differences between the [potentiality] test and
the 'exclusive pleadings' test would be nonexistent in most cases and
small in the remainder. '41 The line between the exclusive pleading test
and the potentiality test in Florida is thereby blurred, and perhaps
nonexistent.
B. Duties Regarding Claims Outside of Coverage
Florida law tends to resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of the
insured. Nevertheless, there are many situations in which the insurer is
not required to defend or indemnify, such as where the party demanding
a defense is not insured, or where the claim alleged is not covered, or is
specifically excluded by the policy.
Obviously, a party demanding a defense is not entitled to one if he
is simply not an insured, such as if his policy has expired. Similarly, if
the insured's policy does not cover a vehicle involved in an accident, the
insurer will have no duty to defend or indemnify. 2 Further, the insured
has no right to a defense if the complaint alleges injuries which are not
covered by the policy. This can happen if, for example, the complaint
alleges personal injuries43 but the insurance policy only provides for
bodily injury and property damage.
Perhaps the most frequently litigated disputes regarding the
insurer's duties involve exclusions to coverage. An insurer is relieved of
any obligations to defend or indemnify by many types of exclusions,
such as the "business pursuits" exclusion in a homeowner's policy," the
criminal acts exclusion, and commercial policy exclusions related to vio-
lations of alcoholic beverage laws.45 The paradigmatic case, however,
involves the intentional injury exclusion.46
41. Fischer, supra note I1, at 162-63.
42. See, e.g., Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Paulekas, 633 So. 2d 1111, 1112-13 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994) (purchase date of boat "vital" to determine whether the boat came under the homeowner's
insurance policy).
43. Insurance law defines "personal injuries" as harm from such sources as libel, slander, or
false arrest. The tort law concept of personal injury, including physical bodily harm, is referred to
in insurance law as "bodily injury."
44. See, e.g., Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the
activity of insureds who operated day-care center in home and were accused of sexual molestation
fell under business pursuits exclusion; the activity in which they were engaged was "babysitting,"
which was a business pursuit, not "molesting children," which is not a business pursuit).
45. See Baker v. Casualty Indem. Exch., 561 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that
insurer had no duty to defend restaurant owner where complaint alleged violation of Florida
alcoholic beverage laws, which was specifically excluded by policy).
46. Earlier versions of the CGL policy placed this exclusion in the "Definitions" section, by
defining an "occurrence" which would trigger coverage as being "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Comprehensive General Liability Policy, Insurance Services
[Vol. 50:945
1996] INSURANCE LAW
The intentional acts exclusion47 usually appears in cases of assault
and battery under homeowners' policies, and in commercial cases where
an insured did not intend harm, but the activity was likely to cause
harm.4" All liability policies exclude intentional acts from coverage,
because covering such acts would frustrate the insurer's ability to calcu-
late fair rates, and because public policy forbids relieving a person of the
consequences of his own willful acts.4 9 While no one seriously disputes
that intentional acts should be excluded from coverage, there is consid-
erable dispute over what acts are "intentional."5 For instance, assuming
Office, Inc. (1973). More recent versions have moved the intentional injury exclusion to the
"Exclusions" section of the policy. Commercial General Liability Policy, Insurance Services
Office, Inc. (1988). In either case, the effect of the clause is the same-no coverage for an injury
that the insured intentionally caused.
47. This exclusion is referred to as either the "intentional acts exclusion" or the "intentional
injury exclusion." While the term "intentional acts" would suggest a broader definition of the
exclusion, because any act resulting in injury could be excluded, the label is not dispositive. One
must look to the substantive law of the jurisdiction to determine the scope of the exclusion,
regardless of the label the courts use.
48. Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property
Damage Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability
Policy, 19 FORUM 513 (1984). For a discussion of a specific application of the intentional injury
exclusion, see Janet L. Brown & Michaela D. Scheihing, Discrimination Claims: Must the
Insurer Defend or Indemnify Its Insured?, 43 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 167 (1993)
(discussing duty to defend where insured is accused of housing discrimination violations).
49. JERRY, supra note 8, at 304.
50. One such dispute involves the problem of the insane tortfeasor. See generally Catherine
A. Salton, Mental Incapacity and Liability Insurance Exclusionary Clauses: The Effect of
Insanity upon Intent, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1027 (1990) (discussing two lines of authority, one holding
that an insane act does not trigger the intentional act exclusion, and the other excluding coverage
where the insane person understands the physical nature and consequences of the act).
Under Florida law, an act committed by an insane individual is not subjectively "intentional"
within the meaning of the intentional act exclusion. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Dunkel, 363 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); George v. Stone, 260 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1972); see also S. Sue Robbins et al., The Insane Tortfeasor and Liability Insurance
Coverage Exclusions, 58 FLA. BJ. 213 (1984). However, where an insurance policy described an
objective standard, excluding coverage for "bodily injury which may reasonably be expected to
result from the intentional ... acts of an insured," one court held that the acts of an insane man
who shot several people in a shopping center excluded coverage. Allstate Ins. v. Cruse, 734 F.
Supp. 1574, 1579 (M.D. Fla. 1989). Thus, if the insured intends to cause injury and understands
the physical consequences of his actions, then the act will trigger the intentional injury exclusion,
even if the insured was insane. See Johnson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 350 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Va.
1986) (insured who had been found not guilty for reason of insanity in shooting of his friend was
found to have intended the shooting for purposes of insurance law, since "he knew that he was
shooting a human being").
Another dispute involves actions taken in self-defense. Some courts have held that acts of
self-defense do not trigger the intentional injury exclusion, because the insured presumably did
not intend to become involved. See, e.g., Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Persons, 393 N.W.2d 234, 237
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reasoning that one who has acted in self-defense has not used "insurance
coverage as a license to commit wanton and malicious acts"). Under Florida law, however, the
intentional act exclusion in a liability policy excludes coverage for acts taken in self-defense.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Marshall, 554 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1989), followed in Aetna
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the insured intended the act, must the injury be a direct result of the
intentional act, or does "intentional" include an injury that was an unin-
tended result of an intentional act? There are three basic approaches to
this problem.-"
The approach that provides the broadest definition of "inten-
tional"-and therefore the narrowest coverage-uses the tort concept of
foreseeability. This approach excludes foreseeable injuries resulting
from intentional acts, regardless of whether the insured intended the
result. 52 The problem with this approach in an insurance context is that
foreseeability is often an element in tort actions. Excluding foreseeable
injuries would exclude negligence claims and frustrate the very purpose
of insurance. 3 The Florida Supreme Court has rejected this approach,
stating that it is "totally unsuited and unadaptable in construing accident
policies," and would "do violence to the reason for buying accident
insurance. 54
At the other end of the spectrum is the approach which provides the
narrowest definition of "intentional"-and therefore the broadest cover-
age. This approach requires that, to qualify as intentional, the insured
intend the act that causes injury, and the insured intend the specific
injury that results. 5   For an extreme example under this approach,
assume that the insured intentionally and willfully broke someone's leg,
and the victim unexpectedly went into shock and died. The insured's act
of killing the victim would not be considered intentional, since the
insured did not intend the exact harm that resulted.
Florida has rejected this rule as well, and follows the rule set forth
in Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Swindal,56 that for
the intentional act exclusion to apply, the insured must have both
intended the act, and intended that some injury or harm occur.57 In
Swindal, the insured and his neighbor had been involved in an ongoing
feud, which culminated in a shooting.58 After the neighbor drove
through the insured's driveway brandishing a hammer, the insured
Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Griss, 568 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1990). In Marshall, the court stated that the
clear language of the policy excluded intentional acts, and acts of self-defense are clearly
intentional. 554 So. 2d at 506.
51. JERRY, supra note 8, at 306.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 647 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Kan. Ct. App.
1982).
53. Rynearson, supra note 48, at 515.
54. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1957), quoted in Prudential Property
and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swindal, 622 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 1993).
55. See, e.g., Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979).
56. 622 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1993).
57. Id. at 473.
58. Id. at 469.
(Vol. 50:945
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grabbed his handgun and gave chase.5 9 The insured caught up to his
neighbor and, carrying his loaded handgun with a finger on the trigger,
approached his neighbor's car.60 The insured then reached inside the car
to grab what he thought was a gun, and the two men struggled. The
insured's gun fired, causing severe bodily injury to the neighbor. 6' Pur-
suant to the intentional injury exclusion, the insurer refused to pay. The
Florida Supreme Court concluded that where an insured commits an
intentional act intending to cause only fear, but unintentionally causes
bodily injury, then the intentional injury exclusion does not apply.62
Under this approach, an intentional act that results in unintended
damages is not excluded. In Grissom v. Commercial Union Insurance
Co.,63 the insured had filled and elevated a watercourse and as a result
neighboring property was flooded and sustained damage. 64  The court
stated, "Clearly, the intentional filling of the watercourse was not an
'accident' under the policy; but the unintentional flooding and damage
to church property resulting from the negligent failure to provide ade-
quate drainage facilities, being neither expected nor intended, does con-
stitute an accident within [Florida] case law. ' 65
Perhaps the most difficult cases involving the intentional act exclu-
sion are those involving sexual abuse of children by the insured. The
majority of courts hold that injury resulting from sexual molestation by




62. Id. at 473. The same reasoning was applied in a case in which an insured doctor, "being
mildly upset, intentionally tugged on both ends of the stethoscope draped around [another
doctor's] neck," which caused the other doctor to suffer a herniated cervical disk. Aetna Casualty
and Sur. Co. v. Miller, 550 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The court noted, "That [the
insured] did not intend to cause the resulting physical injury does not avoid the policy's
intentional act exclusion." Id.
63. 610 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
64. Id. at 1301.
65. Id. at 1307; see also Orear v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2d DCA) (holding
that insured's intentional act of pushing a friend while "slam dancing," which resulted in the
friend falling and striking his head, presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the act
reasonably could have been expected to cause bodily injury), rev. denied, 630 So. 2d 1098 (1993).
There is one situation in which the insured will not trigger the intentional act exclusion, even
though he intended to commit harm. This occurs when the insured is mistaken as to the target's
identity. Spengler v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 568 So. 2d 1293, 1295, 1297 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990) (exclusion did not apply where boyfriend shot his girlfriend when he mistook her for
a burglar, because he did not "intend to injure the person actually injured" by the act) (citing Sabri
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 488 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1986) (interpreting the same
exclusionary clause)).
66. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 206 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1984) (criminal prohibition on
sexual acts with children was designed to protect children from harm, thus intent to harm can be
inferred as a matter of law when such acts are committed); Linebaugh v. Berdish, 376 N.W.2d
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dard to determine whether the insured intended to harm the child.67
Although one Florida court had adopted the subjective intent standard
for sexual abuse cases,6" the Florida Supreme Court, in Landis v. All-
state Insurance Co. ,69 disapproved of that decision and held that specific
intent to commit harm is not required to exclude coverage in cases of
sexual abuse; the intent is inferred as a matter of law. 0 Thus, the sexual
abuse cases do not change the rule in Florida regarding the intentional
act exclusion. To be excluded, the insured must both intend the act and
intend that some harm result.
There is another special class of cases in which intent will be
inferred as a matter of law: cases in which the insured is convicted of a
crime. In such situations, the criminal conviction may collaterally estop
the insured from seeking coverage or defense under his insurance pol-
400, 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (inferring intent to harm as a matter of law); Estate of Lehmann v.
Metzger, 355 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. 1984) (same); Rodriguez v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 630
(Wash. 1986) (same).
67. E.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H. 1984) (applying
subjective standard, and rejecting arguments that intent should be inferred as a matter of law, and
that public policy should preclude allowing a child molester to insure himself against liability);
see also State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1194 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (finding
the insured "had no specific intent to cause bodily harm to his minor granddaughter ... when he
sexually abused her in a nonviolent way on the two occasions in question"). Contra CNA Ins. Co.
v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ark. 1984) ("The test is what a plain ordinary person would
expect and intend to result from a mature man's deliberately debauching his six-year-old
stepdaughter and continuing to do so for years.").
68. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
While the court's holding rested on traditional principles of policy interpretation, and on the
refusal to import tort foreseeability into insurance law, the court mentioned the importance of
securing compensation for the victim. "[A] conclusion in this insurance coverage case that there
may be insurance coverage as compensation for injuries inflicted by the insured which the
premiums received by the insurers were paid to provide would, however incidentally, be
consistent with the interests of the child." Id. at 613.
69. 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989).
70. Id. at 1053. The Landis opinion caused some uncertainty in the law regarding the
intentional injury exclusion, because it said "all intentional acts are properly excluded by the
express language of the homeowners policy." Id. This statement sweeps much more broadly than
the established rule that exclusion required an intentional act and intent to commit some form of
harm. One court challenged this sentence, asking, "whether a literal interpretation of the
statement that all intentional acts bar coverage, does not create an insurmountable barrier to
coverage. We would suggest that nearly all accidents have at their beginning an intentional act."
Orear v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 974, 976 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The Florida Supreme
Court later limited the scope of its language in Landis, stating:
Landis held that an intentional injury exclusion clause excluded coverage for
injuries suffered by children who were sexually molested while under the care of the
insureds. . . . Our decision in Landis did not suggest that courts apply tort law
causation principles of "reasonably foreseeable" or "natural and probable
consequences" in construing the intentional injury clause in insurance contracts.
Rather, we merely found that an intent to injure is inherent in the act of sexually
abusing a child.
Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swindal, 622 So. 2d 467, 471-72 (Fla. 1993).
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icy.7 One Florida court suggested that a conviction can have collateral
estoppel effect if it is for a crime for which intent is an element. 72 In
that case, the insured was convicted of second-degree murder for reck-
lessly firing a gun into a crowd. The court held that, notwithstanding the
conviction, the act was not excluded where "the defendant has no intent
to hit or kill anyone. '73 Thus, a criminal conviction for the act does not
exclude coverage and defense unless intent is an element of the crime.
"The primary consideration in determining if an intentional act exclu-
sion clause applies is whether the insured had the subjective, specific
intent to cause any harm to his victim. ' 74  Therefore, "strict liability"
crimes that do not require proof of intent, such as statutory rape and
driving while intoxicated, should not exclude coverage. General intent
crimes, in which subjective intent is irrelevant to proof, also should not
exclude coverage. These include crimes such as second-degree mur-
der,7 5 rape, and possession of controlled substances. Conviction of a
"specific intent" crime for which intent must be proved, however, such
as robbery,76 first degree murder, and battery, should trigger exclusion.77
II. DECIDING TO FILE THE DECLARATORY ACTION
As discussed above, Florida law favors the insured in insurance
coverage disputes. 78  Nevertheless, when insurers believe that a claim
falls outside of policy coverage, they certainly will not accept responsi-
bility without a challenge. 79  The insurer has three basic options when
71. See, e.g., Morton v. Safeco Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1990) (violation of
California Penal Code for criminal sexual assault of a minor is a willful act, and is thus excluded
from insurance coverage).
72. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
73. Id. at 905.
74. Thomas D. Sawaya, Use of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil Proceedings:
Statutory Collateral Estoppel Under Florida and Federal Law and the Intentional Act Exclusion
Clause, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 479, 532 (1988).
75. See Perez, 384 So. 2d 904.
76. See Bosson v. Uderitz, 426 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
77. Sawaya, supra note 74, at 532-33.
Those who believe in using insurance coverage for victim compensation may suggest that
prosecutors consider the preclusive effects of specific intent crimes when charging suspects, and
tailor the charges so that insurance coverage is not excluded. Asking a prosecutor to perform such
a function, however, would favor certain criminal suspects, e.g., those with homes who carry
insurance, over other suspects, and would therefore raise equal protection problems. This practice
should not be encouraged.
78. For a full discussion of the duty to defend, see supra part I.A.
79. See L. Louis Mrachek, The Insurer's Options: When Confronted with a Liability Claim,
54 FLA. B.J. 341 (1980). To preserve its rights to deny coverage, the insurer must comply with
the claims administration statute. This provision requires the insurer to provide written notice to
the insured of the coverage defense, and either give written notice of its refusal to defend, obtain a
nonwaiver agreement, or retain independent counsel for the insured. FLA. STAT. § 627.426
(1995).
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confronted with a claim which it believes is outside of coverage: it can
refuse to defend, it can defend under a reservation of rights, or it can
defend without reservation.8 0  Each option brings certain risks. If the
insurer refuses to defend and the claim is later found to have been within
coverage, the insurer is liable to the insured for breach of contract.8" If
the insurer defends under a reservation of rights, it places itself in a
conflict of interest with the insured. 2 If the insurer defends without
reservation, it risks waiving coverage defenses.8 3
In combination with any of these options, the insurer can file a
declaratory judgment action to determine its duties. The declaratory
action is an important tool for the insurer, and can also benefit the
injured third party.81 There are several advantages for the insurer who
files a declaratory judgment action. Primarily, if the insurer is held to
have no duty under the policy, then it avoids the expense of defending
the tort action.
8 5
Some Florida courts have considered an insurer to have waived
coverage defenses despite a nonwaiver agreement, where the insurer
continued to defend the insured for an extended period of time after the
insurer had completed its investigation. 6 An insurer can avoid such a
waiver by filing a declaratory judgment action.8 7 Strategically, the
insurer obtains an additional advantage by filing an action, because it
thereby notifies its insureds and the plaintiff's counsel that the insurer
80. Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's Duty to
Defend: Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 92-94 (1965).
81. Mrachek, supra note 79, at 343. If the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, it may be
liable for a judgment in excess of the policy limits. Id.; see also Thomas v. Western World Ins.
Co., 343 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
82. Mrachek, supra note 79, at 344. The insured and the insurer both want the insured to be
found not liable. The conflict arises if the insured is liable. In that case, the insured has an
interest in being held liable for a covered claim, while the insurer has a conflicting interest in
having the insured found liable for a noncovered or excluded reason.
83. Id. at 343.
84. Unless the insured has "deep pockets" of its own, the injured party would certainly be
concerned about the availability of insurance coverage to pay a judgment. The declaratory action
allows the injured party to know if insurance coverage is available. Note, supra note 80, at 95-96;
see, e.g., Smith v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 641 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(plaintiff injured by insured's driver filed declaratory action against insurer to determine insurer's
duty to defend).
85. Robert S. Treece & Richard D. Hall, When Do You File a Declaratory Judgment Action?,
53 INs. CouNs. J. 396, 397-98 (1986). The authors note that it is difficult to obtain a final
judgment quickly, and suggest that the sooner the declaratory judgment action is filed after the
insured has been served in the tort action, the more likely the trial court will be to expedite the
declaratory judgment action. Id. at 398.
86. Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 436, 441 (Fla. 1968).
87. Treece & Hall, supra note 85, at 398.
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will aggressively fight questionable claims.88
There are, of course, corresponding disadvantages to filing a
declaratory judgment action. The principal problem, according to some
commentators, is the "practical procedural difficulty" that may result
from delaying the underlying tort action between the third party and the
insured.8 9 Furthermore, an insurer is always concerned with the good-
will of its business, and initiating litigation against its own insured cer-
tainly impacts goodwill adversely.90 Another disadvantage of the
declaratory judgment action is expense. Since most tort actions are set-
tled before trial, and thus before coverage questions are determined, the
declaratory action may seem unnecessary, and it may appear in hind-
sight that the expense of filing the action could have been saved.91 Of
course, the "unnecessary" declaratory action may have had a strong
influence on the parties' negotiating positions.
Whether or not to bring a declaratory judgment is a serious, strate-
gic decision for the insurer.9
2
In spite of these drawbacks, the declaratory judgment action pro-
vides the insurer with an expeditious avenue for determining its rights
and obligations under the insurance policy. . . . [T]he declaratory
judgment action gives notice to the public that an insurer will not
meekly capitulate, but will take an aggressive stance, when dealing
with questionable claims.93
Thus, although the declaratory judgment action is an effective tool for
insurers, it is a double-edged sword, and insurers do not use it without
seriously considering the consequences.
88. Dianne K. Ericsson, Declaratory Judgment: Is It a Real or Illusory Solution?, 23 TORT &
INS. LJ. 161, 179 (1987).
89. Betty R. Dohoney, The Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 451, 482
(1981).
90. Ericsson, supra note 88, at 179. "Whatever goodwill the insured still has toward the
insurance company despite the disagreements over coverage will be dissipated by the filing of
such an action against him." Treece & Hall, supra note 85, at 399-400.
91. See Treece & Hall, supra note 85, at 400.
92. Of course, an insured or third-party claimant may also file a declaratory judgment action
to prove that coverage exists. See e.g., Smith v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 641 So. 2d 123
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (suit brought by injured party against tort defendant's insurer). The problem
with such suits, however, is that there may be no justiciable controversy between the parties
before a judgment in the underlying action fixes the parties' liabilities. Ericsson, supra note 88, at
164; see also Dohoney, supra note 89, at 482 (noting that Texas courts cannot decide questions of
indemnification, because they may not give advisory opinions). Where the insurer takes a firm
position disclaiming coverage, however, Florida courts have determined that an actual controversy
exists. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. W.W. Gay Mechanical Contractor, Inc., 351 So. 2d 403, 403 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
93. Ericsson. supra note 88, at 180.
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III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN INSURANCE DISPUTES IN FLORIDA
Recently, there has been disagreement among Florida courts
regarding the rights of insurers to bring declaratory actions. One ques-
tion is whether the declaratory action is available to resolve questions of
fact. The other, more difficult question is whether the insurer can bring
the declaratory judgment action to determine rights under an insurance
policy before the parties in the underlying action determine liability.
This latter issue is especially difficult if the same question must be
resolved in both the underlying and coverage actions.
A. Statutory Authority for the Action
Declaratory judgment actions in Florida are governed by Chapter
86 of the Florida statutes. 94 Florida originally adopted its version of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in 1943, 95 and the law remains fun-
damentally the same. The law grants trial courts96 jurisdiction to render
declarations regarding the legal or factual questions regarding the exist-
ence or nonexistence of "any immunity, power, privilege, or right" of
the parties.97 The following three sections of the statute provide for spe-
cific cases in which a trial court has the power to enter a decree. Such
cases include construing deeds, wills, or contracts,98 construing a con-
tract before or after breach, 99 and hearing actions by "executors, admin-
istrators, trustees, etc."' 00 After specifying these instances, the law
states that they are not exclusive, and that they do not "limit or restrict"
the availability of declaratory judgments in any actions which meet the
94. FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011-.111 (1995).
95. Ch. 21820, Laws of Fla. (1943).
96. The law was amended in 1990 to allow county courts, as well as circuit courts, to decide
declaratory judgment actions "within their respective jurisdictional amounts." FLA. STAT.
§ 86.011 (1995).
97. Id. The jurisdictional grant states:
The circuit and county courts have jurisdiction within their respective
jurisdictional amounts to declare rights, status, and other equitable or legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed .... The court may render
declaratory judgments on the existence, or nonexistence:
(1) Of any immunity, power, privilege, or right; or
(2) Of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such immunity,
power, privilege, or right does or may depend, whether such immunity, power,
privilege, or right now exists or will arise in the future. Any person seeking a
declaratory judgment may also demand additional, alternative, coercive, subsequent,
or supplemental relief in the same action.
l
98. FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (1995).
99. FLA. STAT. § 86.031 (1995). This provision would seem to allow an action by an insured
against the insurer, if the insurer indicates that it will not provide coverage. For example, a
reservation of rights by the insurer may indicate a future breach. See supra note 92.
100. FLA. STAT. § 86.041 (1995).
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requirements of section 86.011.101 In cases involving questions of fact,
the law provides for jury trials in declaratory proceedings.
10 2
The statute contains its own rule of construction, 10 3 which states
that the law is remedial, and is to be "liberally administered and con-
strued." 1°4 The declaratory judgment action in Florida is therefore a
flexible tool for resolving a wide range of disputes. With this statutory
authority, insurers regularly bring actions to determine their duties to
defend and indemnify insureds.
B. Questions of Fact in Insurance Coverage Cases
Before describing the present split of authority in Florida, it is nec-
essary to clear up a fine point regarding the power of courts to decide
questions of fact in declaratory judgments. This Comment's central
argument is that parties should be permitted to bring declaratory actions
to determine their rights regarding insurance before a court determines
liability in the underlying action, if necessary. As indicated above, the
insurer's duty to defend often depends on questions of fact, such as
whether a certain act was intentional. Therefore, this section addresses
the ancillary issue of a court's power to decide a question of fact in a
declaratory judgment action.
The first Florida Supreme Court case to interpret the jurisdiction of
a court to hear a declaratory judgment action in an insurance case was
Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman.10 5 Despite the express language
of the statute which granted jurisdiction over questions of fact to trial
courts," the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the proceeding, because the issue before the court
was a question of fact, and there was no question of contract interpreta-
tion before the court.1
0 7
Zimmerman involved an automobile accident. A woman was driv-
ing a vehicle owned by the insured when the vehicle collided with a city
101. FLA. STAT. § 86.051 (1995). 'The enumeration in ss. 86.021, 86.031 and 86.041 does not
limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in s. 86.011 in any action where
declaratory relief is sought." Id.
102. FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1995). The section provides that fact issues are tried in declaratory
judgment actions in the same way as in other civil actions.
103. FLA. STAT. § 86.101 (1995).
104. Id.
105. 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952).
106. At the time of the case, the law regarding declaratory decrees was codified in Chapter 87
of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-.13 (1951). The statutes were moved to Chapter 86
in 1967. The current language remains fundamentally the same.
107. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d at 340. It appears that the pleadings may have only alleged a
claim under FLA. STAT. § 87.02 (1951), which gives the power to construe contracts. Id.
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bus.108 The collision caused substantial injury and damage, and several
bus passengers sued the driver and the owner/insured.1t 9 The driver
then demanded that the owner's insurer provide a defense.110 The
owner's insurer refused to defend, claiming that the driver was not driv-
ing with the knowledge and consent of the insured, and thus the insurer
was not obliged to provide a defense."' The insurer then sought a dec-
laration of whether it was obliged to provide a defense, but the trial court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim within the declaratory
judgments statute." 2
On appeal, the supreme court stated, "The real question which
appellants sought to have determined is a purely factual one, namely,
whether or not Mary Yates was driving the automobile with the knowl-
edge and consent of the owners, or either of them." ' 3 The court then
stated that the controlling sections of the statute were section 87.02,114
regarding the power to construe contracts, and section 87.05,115 which
provided that the specific enumerations in the statute were not exclusive,
and that declarations could issue regarding future rights and duties.
Despite stating that section 87.05 was implicated, however, the majority
analyzed the claim only in terms of section 87.02, and found that it did
not apply because it did not involve interpretation of the insurance pol-
icy itself.
The court determined that under section 87.02 courts could only
issue declarations involving the interpretation of documents, not ques-
tions of fact. The court stated, "The question of whether or not the auto-
mobile was being driven with the knowledge and consent of the insured
was a question of fact to be determined as any other question of fact and
requires no construction of the insurance policy in order to determine the
meaning thereof.'"
1 6
This holding conflicts with the statutes. Section 87.05, which the
majority acknowledged was implicated in the case, referred specifically
to section 87.01,1 17 which authorized circuit courts to render declaratory
108. Id. at 338.
109. Id.
110. Id. The driver was insured as well, but her policy contained a clause which provided that
if she operated a non-owned automobile, her policy would be excess insurance to any other valid
and collectible insurance available. The driver and her insurance company both made demand
upon Columbia Casualty to defend the suits. Id.
111. Id. at 338.
112. Id. at 339.
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 87.02 (1951). Substantially identical language is now codified at § 86.021.
115. FLA. STAT. § 87.05 (1951) (presently codified at § 86.051).
116. Zimmennan, 62 So. 2d at 339.
117. FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1951) (presently codified at section 86.011).
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judgments on questions of fact upon which contractual rights depend.""
The majority interpreted section 87.01 to confer only jurisdiction, and
insisted that a declaratory action can only proceed when there is some
ambiguity or doubt about the contract.' 1 9
The Zimmerman court also reasoned that the issue of the insured's
knowledge and consent could not be decided in a declaratory action,
because it was a question of fact, "to be determined as any other ques-
tion of fact."1 20 The court's interpretation notwithstanding, the determi-
nation of fact questions was certainly contemplated by the legislature in
section 87.08,121 which provided for jury trials of declaratory judgments:
"When a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an
issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner
as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the
circuit court in which the proceeding is pending."'122 The irony of the
Zimmerman court's choice of words is inescapable; using the same lan-
guage in its opinion as the legislature had in the statute, the supreme
court reached the opposite result. The court reasoned that because ques-
tions of fact must be tried as they are tried in other actions, they may not
be resolved by declaratory judgment. But the legislature had already
required that courts try questions of fact in declaratory judgments, spe-
cifically so that courts would determine questions of fact in the same
manner in declaratory actions as in other actions. In a sense, the court
was treating declaratory actions as different from other actions though
the legislature had attempted to treat them in the same way.
The'dissenting justice noted that the test to activate the declaratory
judgments statute was "whether or not the moving party shows that he is
in doubt as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immu-
nity, power or privilege .... 23 The dissent noted that the driver and
the insurer were certainly in doubt as to their rights and liabilities under
the policy, and that these doubts would have been resolved by the
declaratory judgment action.124 It is also significant that the fact at issue
118. Chapter 87.01 (1951); see supra note 97 for the present statute's virtually identical
language.
119. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d at 340.
120. Id. at 339.
121. FLA. STAT. § 87.08 (1951).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d at 341 (Terrell, J., dissenting) (quoting Ready v. Safeway Rock
Co., 24 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1946) (Terrell, J.), which first interpreted the declaratory judgments act
and set forth the test for activating jurisdiction in a declaratory action)).
124. Id. at 342.
Whether or not Mary Yates was driving the automobile at the time of the collision,
with the consent of the owners, is a very important point in this litigation. It may be
vital to other suits growing out of the collision. If the contention of appellant is
sustained, numerous suits against it may be forestalled. All the text-writers and
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in Zimmerman was not an issue in the underlying tort litigation. Pre-
sumably, the alleged negligence of the driver had nothing to do with her
permission or lack of permission to use the automobile. Since the fac-
tual determination here would have no impact on the tort suit, and there
would therefore be no collateral estoppel, it is surprising that the court
did not allow the action.' 25 Moreover, in a trial between the allegedly
negligent driver and the injured third parties, the question of whether the
driver had permission to use the vehicle may never have arisen. The
insurer might therefore have been deprived of any forum in which to
address the issue.
To say that the insurer could argue the issue later, in a coverage
case, is not satisfactory. First, allowing multiple suits to be brought, and
then forcing the plaintiffs to bring additional suits against the insurer is
not an efficient use of judicial resources. Second, as one court noted,
arguing that an insurer should defend where it has no obligation to do so,
rather than resolving the issue by declaratory action, "ignores the fact
that providing a defense where there is no legal obligation to do so con-
stitutes an irreparable injury in and of itself."1 26 Further, the insured
wants to be defended, and the plaintiff wants the insured to be covered
so there is a "deep pocket" from which to secure a judgment. Neither
party has an interest in resolving coverage issues. Without a declaratory
judgment action, the insurer has no forum. The result is a "perfect con-
spiracy between a plaintiff and the insured and the insurer has no
remedy."' 27
many of the decisions hold that declaratory action is an ideal way to prevent resort
to a multiplicity of suits.
Id.
125. See Treece & Hall, supra note 85, at 397 (noting that declaratory judgments are
"generally available" for these types of fact questions).
One possible explanation for the overly restrictive interpretation of the statute is that the
justices were not comfortable with giving such broad scope to declaratory judgments. The Florida
Supreme Court first interpreted the modem declaratory judgments act in Ready v. Safeway Rock
Co., 24 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1946). The opinion included a special concurrence which expressed
concern with the breadth of the act, id. at 811-12, and suggested that it be "cautiously applied and
construed." Id. at 812. The concurring justice reminded courts not to give legal advice, to
exercise discretion in allowing declaratory judgments, and only to gradually allow new types of
actions to be brought as declaratory actions. Id. at 811-12.
Another explanation for the narrow interpretation may be simple cultural lag. Prior to the
1943 law, Florida had a much more limited declaratory judgment statute. Ch. 7857, Laws of Fla.
(1919). The statute allowed for a bill in equity to determine interest under a deed, will, or
contract. This law was quite similar to § 87.02, which was at issue in the Zimmerman case. The
concurrence in Ready quoted at length from the case which had construed the 1919 act, and urged
that the two laws be construed similarly. Ready, 24 So. 2d at 811-12. The decision in
Zimmerman could therefore be seen as a return to the Acts of 1919.
126. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Nail, 516 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).




Despite these problems, the supreme court has not modified the
Zimmerman rule that a declaratory judgment action is not available for
purely factual questions. 28 Rather, the court reaffirmed Zimmerman in
Bergh v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co.,129  which involved an
insurer's duty to defend a medical malpractice claim under a profes-
sional liability policy.' 30 The insured doctor failed to give timely notice
of a pending malpractice claim which, according to the insurer, violated
the policy.' 31 The insurer had initially undertaken the defense, but later
filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the insured's failure to
give notice was a breach of the policy, and therefore the insured was not
entitled to a defense. 32 The Florida Supreme Court, following Zimmer-
man, held that the questions at issue were merely factual because they
did not involve questions of interpretation, and therefore were not sub-
ject to a declaratory judgment. 33 Like the Zimmerman court, the Bergh
court disregarded clear statutory grants of authority to the courts to
resolve questions of fact. Because the coverage questions in this case
raised no issues important to the underlying malpractice action, the
insurer was once again denied a forum in which to litigate coverage or
defense issues until the tort action was concluded.
34
Questions of fact may be resolved in declaratory judgment proceed-
ings, but only if necessary to a construction of the legal rights of the
parties.135 Nevertheless, some courts have recently followed the Zim-
merman rule denying jurisdiction to trial courts over questions of fact,
even though legal rights depended on resolution of those questions.
36
128. There have been opportunities. The court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde recognized a
possible conflict with the Zimmerman case, 595 So. 2d at 1007 n.4, and certified the following
question to the supreme court: "May the insurer pursue a declaratory action in order to have
declared its obligation under an unambiguous policy even if the court must determine the
existence or nonexistence of a fact in order to determine the insurer's responsibility?" Id. at 1008.
129. 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968).
130. Id. at 437.
131. Id. at 438.
132. Id. at 438-39.
133. Id. at 440. "Nowhere does it appear an interpretation of the language of the policy or of
the nonwaiver agreement was a part of the decisional disposition of the declaratory judgment
proceedings. The correctness of the determination of factual issues was the sole subject decided
by the District Court . I..." ld
The court in Bergh could be seen to have narrowed Zimmerman by stating that the common
issue was "whether the insurer is liable to the insured in view of alleged breaches of policy
provisions-said determinations involving, in each case, factual questions and issues and not
contract interpretations or construction." Id. at 440.
134. For a discussion of statutory and policy objections to the rule in Zimmerman, see supra
notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 97 for text of § 86.011; see also Smith v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 197 So. 2d
548, 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 571 So. 2d
598, 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
136. Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend, 544 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); cf.
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The Conde court, however, called this interpretation of the statute into
question, stating, "This interpretation limits Chapter 86 to little more
than a codification of the parol evidence rule. Chapter 86 should not be
read so narrowly."'
37
C. Traditional Rule: Determine Defense, not Indemnity, Before
Liability
A distinct but closely related issue to the propriety of resolving
factual questions in a declaratory judgment action is the propriety of
allowing the declaratory action to proceed before liability has been
decided. The timing of the declaratory judgment action is very impor-
tant to the parties. It is in the insurer's interest to have the option to
bring the declaratory judgment action early in the litigation. 38  If the
insurer can show that it is impossible for the claim to come within policy
coverage, then the insurer will be relieved of all obligations.' 39 It is
certainly in the insurer's interest to get such a declaration before the tort
action, rather than after, since providing a defense where there is no
legal obligation constitutes an irreparable injury.'40 Bringing the cover-
age action early may also further judicial economy. If potential insur-
ance proceeds are the insured's only asset, the third party may simply
save itself the expense of pursuing a worthless judgment.
In Florida, most courts have not allowed insurers to bring declara-
tory judgments before the tort action. Declaratory relief is generally
unavailable until after liability is decided, especially if the coverage
action could involve questions at issue in the underlying litigation.' 4'
Florida has followed the general rule that if, when the declaratory action
is brought, a tort suit is pending "which involves the same issues and in
which litigation the plaintiff in the declaratory decree may secure full,
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("We find it equally clear
that this declaration does not depend solely upon a factual determination, but requires the court's
interpretation of the ... exclusion ....") (first emphasis added).
137. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The Conde court
criticized and retreated from its interpretation of Chapter 86 in Vanguard. Id. at 1006-07.
138. Whether the insurer will in fact bring the action depends on a number of strategic factors.
See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. One court stated, "[I]t has generally been
recognized as prudent, insurance company practice to have coverage resolved as promptly as
possible." Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Central Jersey lnvs. Inc., 632 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994).
139. See supra part I.A.; see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Keen, 658 So. 2d 1101,
1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend where the insured
unequivocally disclosed facts to the insurer that negated coverage).
140. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Nail, 516 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
141. Home Ins. Co. v. Gephart, 639 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). But see Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (allowing declaratory judgment action where
complaint alleges alternative mutually exclusive theories).
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adequate and complete relief, such bill for declaratory decree will not be
permitted to stand."' 42 The problem for insurers who seek declaratory
decrees is that they are not parties to the tort action, and so cannot get
complete relief. Further, insurers are usually not permitted to intervene
in the tort action.'43 And some courts have held that declaratory actions
are not available if the underlying action is pending, and the parties are
litigating common issues. 144 Thus, the insurer is not permitted a voice in
the main action, and is also denied a separate forum in which to raise the
issues.
14 5
Many courts have allowed a declaration regarding the duty to
defend, but have required that a declaration regarding the duty to indem-
nify must wait until the parties determine liability. 146 In International
Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Markham,'47 the court stated that the
"only determination for the trial court to make" in the declaratory action
was whether the insurer was required to defend the insured against the
complaint.' 48 It was important for the court to determine the duty to
defend at the outset of litigation, because requiring the insurer to defend
where it had no obligation would constitute an irreparable injury to the
insurer.' 49 The court refused to determine indemnification, holding:
[I]f the trial court determines that [the insurer] has no duty to defend,
the issue of whether [the insurer] has a duty to indemnify the
[insured] will be moot. On the other hand, if [the insurer] has a duty
to defend, then any determination as to its duty to indemnify should
be deferred until the issue of Markham's liability is decided.
1 50
Of course, this procedure can only be implemented where determining
142. Taylor v. Cooper, 60 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1952), quoted in Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend,
544 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
143. See Vanguard, 544 So. 2d at 1154.
144. Id. at 1155; Irvine v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1993).
145. The Alabama Supreme Court solved the dilemma by holding that "intent" for insurance
coverage purposes is a different issue than "intent" for purposes of the underlying tort action.
Therefore, a declaratory judgment action could proceed. Smith v. North River Ins. Co., 360 So.
2d 313 (Ala. 1978). This rule allows the coverage question to proceed separately and
independently of the main action, and allows all parties to be heard.
146. See, e.g., Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 700 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
147. 580 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
148. Id. at 253; see supra part I.A. for a discussion of the duty to defend in Florida.
149. Id. at 254 (citing State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Nail, 516 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1987)).
150. Id. The Third District Court of Appeal applied the same analysis in Irvine v. Prudential
Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). There, the injured party sued
the insured for damages for bodily injury, alleging both negligent and intentional acts. The court
held that the insurer must defend the action, but refused to allow a determination of
indemnification, ruling that "the better process is to require the insurer to defend the action under
a reservation of rights." Id. at 580.
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the duty to defend is independent of determining the duty to indem-
nify-and only if the court applies the strict "exclusive pleading" test.
The rule that indemnification cannot be decided before liability is
not universal. Where questions of coverage or defense do not involve
issues common to the underlying action, some courts have allowed
declaratory relief. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Emery' 5t-in which
the injured party had not filed a complaint, so the underlying action did
not even yet exist-the district court held that a declaratory judgment
was proper, and remanded for a determination of coverage.1 52 The court
noted that under the declaratory judgments act, a trial court may render
judgment of any fact upon which the existence of a right may depend,
even if the right may exist only in the future.1 53 The court stated, "It is
patently clear from this record that Travelers' petition presented the
lower court with an actual, bona fide, present need to have the court
declare that Travelers did not cover [the insured] in this situation and
was therefore not obligated to defend him in any resulting lawsuit."
1 54
Similarly, the court in Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Central
Jersey Investments, Inc.,'55 quashed the trial court's order of abate-
ment 1 56 and allowed the declaratory action to proceed.' 57 In that case,
an employee of the insured's bar had killed a patron. The decedent's
estate brought a wrongful death action against the insured, alleging the
insured's failure to intervene, and the employee's negligence.1 58 The
insurer defended under a reservation of rights, and brought a declaratory
action alleging that the claims were excluded based on an Assault &
Battery Endorsement and a Liquor Liability Exclusion. 59 The court
held that because the construction of the liquor liability exclusion did
not involve facts common to the wrongful death action, there was "no
sound policy reason" that would preclude the insurer from litigating the
151. 579 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
152. Id. at 802. Though the injured party had not filed suit, his attorney had sent a letter to the
insured stating, "Mr. Kemp will be seeking legal redress against you." Id. at 799. The district
court, noting that no case has stated that declaratory relief is available only after a tort action has
been filed, id. at 800, held that there was a bona fide controversy between the parties which gave
jurisdiction under FLA. STAT. § 86.011. Id. at 800-02.
153. Id. at 800 (citing FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1987)).
154. Id. at 802.
155. 632 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
156. "Abatement" operates as a stay of proceedings. It is proper in a subsequently filed action,
where a prior action involving the same parties and addressing substantially the same issues is
pending in a court of comparable jurisdiction. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Markham,
580 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Abatement is not proper, however, when the interests
of the parties are antagonistic, as with an insurer and the insured in a case of disputed coverage.
Id.
157. Britamco, 632 So. 2d at 142.




issue before the conclusion of the tort case. 160
D. Conde and the Split Among the District Courts of Appeal
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Emery and Britamco Underwriters v.
Central Jersey Investments can be construed as merely limited excep-
tions to the general rule that the duty to indemnify is not subject to a
declaratory judgment before liability is determined. The decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Conde,
16 1
however, would not fit within this exception. The District Courts of
Appeal are therefore split on the question of when coverage issues may
be decided in declaratory judgment actions. 162
In Conde, the issue of the propriety of using a declaratory judgment
action to determine factual issues is closely related to-and overlaps
with-the issue of whether such a declaratory action may be adjudicated
before liability is determined. Conde involved an insured who went on a
rampage against his family,' 63 killing his son and seriously injuring the
others. 16 The decedent's mother filed an action against the insured for
intentional wrongdoing, a claim excluded under the policy, and negli-
gence, which was covered under the policy.'
65
Regarding the duty to defend, the district court noted that an insurer
must defend the insured at least until covered claims have been elimi-
160. Id. at 141.
161. 595 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
162. Britamco, 632 So. 2d at 141-42 (allowing declaratory judgment action to determine duties
to defend and indemnify where factual issues were not common to underlying action); Irvine v.
Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co.. 630 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (refusing to
allow declaratory judgment action because to do so would allow the insurer to bypass the law
regarding the duty to defend, which must be determined from allegations in complaint); Conde,
595 So. 2d at 1008 (allowing declaratory judgment action where the injured party has alleged
alternative, mutually exclusive theories of liability, one of which is within coverage); International
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Markham, 580 So. 2d 251, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (allowing
declaratory judgment action regarding the duty to defend, but requiring that question regarding the
duty to indemnify be deferred until liability determined at trial) explained in Indemnity Ins. Co. of
N. Am. v. Ridenour, 629 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (stating that indemnity should be
decided expeditiously, since insurer's position depended on the "resolution of facts largely
extraneous to those alleged"); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA
1991) (allowing declaratory judgment action before underlying action where questions were not
common to both actions, and were not solely fact questions). The Third District Court of Appeal
in Irvine explicitly refused to follow the Fifth District Court of Appeal decision in Conde. Irvine,
630 So. 2d at 580.
163. There had been no formal wedding between the adults, but Ms. Montero's children
considered the insured to be their father. Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1006 n.2. The issue of whether the
children were "insureds" under the policy was not discussed at length by the court, and is not
important to this Comment. For simplicity, this Comment will refer to those involved as a
traditional family.
164. The full facts of Conde are quoted in this Comment's introduction.
165. Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1006.
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nated from the action. 166 In a case like Conde, however, the duty to
defend could not be determined without also addressing the duty to
indemnify.
[T]here are not some claims that are covered and some that are
not; the asserted claims are mutually exclusive .... Therefore, the
insurer must provide defense until the coverage issue is resolved. In
a case such as this-alternative, mutually exclusive theories-the
indemnity issue and the duty to defend issue are inextricable. The
resolution of one necessarily resolves the other.
167
Early resolution of the question is essential, because to provide a defense
where there is no legal obligation to do so constitutes irreparable injury
to the insurer.168  The Conde court allowed the declaratory action
regarding the duty to defend to proceed before liability was determined,
even though the duty to defend was intertwined with the duty to indem-
nify. Therefore, a declaration on one issue would unavoidably constitute
a declaration on the other. Unlike earlier cases where the court refused
to allow a pending declaratory action regarding indemnity to proceed,1
9
the Conde court refused to dismiss the declaratory action because of this
effect.
170
166. Id. (citing C.A. Fielland, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 297 So. 2d 122, 127
(Fla. 2d DCA 1974)). Of course, if an insurer is conducting an insured's defense, there is an
inherent conflict of interest; the insurer may be tempted to eliminate covered claims and leave
only excluded claims.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see supra note 149 and accompanying text. One could argue in response that where
the insurer cannot resolve the indemnification early, the negligence count will obviously remain;
so long as the negligence count remains, then the insurer has a legal obligation to defend. See
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1977). This argument
may seem formalistic, but so is the exclusive pleading test which Florida purports to follow, in
that it ignores extrinsic facts in favor of contrived pleadings.
169. See, e.g., Irvine v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1993); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend, 544 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
170. Having determined that the declaratory action could proceed regarding the coverage
issues, the court faced a separate problem. The issue to be determined in Conde was a question of
fact, and the Florida Supreme Court had previously held that declaratory relief is not available for
such questions. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952). For a
discussion of the Zimmerman case and the resolution of factual questions in declaratory
judgments, see supra part III.B.
The Conde court resolved the conflict with Zimmerman by suggesting that the pleadings may
have limited the Zimmerman court's analysis:
The majority in Zimmerman, perhaps because of the pleadings, did not consider the
more expansive provisions of what is now section 86.011 which specifically
authorizes the court to determine if a fact exists (intentional shooting) which would
establish the existence of an "immunity, power. privilege or right" (lack of
coverage). If the legislature did not contemplate some fact finding in declaratory
actions, it is curious why section 86.071 provides that "a determination of an issue
of fact" may be submitted to a jury.
Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1007 n.4.
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Two judges dissented in part in Conde, arguing that the court
should not have allowed the declaratory action to go forward on both the
duty to defend and the duty to indemnify before the trial court fixed the
parties' liability in the tort case. They urged that the court adopt the
procedure used in International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Mark-
ham,' 7 1 under which the court could determine the duty to defend, but
would defer ruling on the duty to indemnify until after liability had been
decided. 72 The majority responded that where the two duties are neces-
sarily resolved by the same question, a determination would resolve both
duties and leave nothing left to defer. 173 In this case, a determination
that Conde acted intentionally would relieve the insurer of the duty to
defend, as well as the duty to indemnify. A contrary finding would
mean that the insurer must indemnify and defend.
The difference between these views is more fundamental, however,
than merely a concern for timing. The majority's contention that "there
is nothing to defer"' 74 once a court resolves the duty to defend issue is
only correct if the court considers the facts extrinsic to the pleadings to
determine the duty. The Markham procedure could certainly work under
the facts of Conde; it would be a simple, mechanical exercise of examin-
ing the pleadings for an asserted, covered claim. 17  Under that proce-
dure, the insurer in Conde would have a duty to defend, because the
complaint contains an allegation of negligence.
The Conde court, however, implicitly rejecting the "exclusive
pleading" test, went beyond the pleadings and stated that where the alle-
gations are mutually exclusive, "the court must, in the declaratory judg-
ment action, determine the 'fact' which will determine the duty to
defend/indemnity issue."' 76 According to the court, the insurer must be
able to participate in the coverage issue, or the danger of collusion
The Conde court held that refusing to allow determination of fact questions in declaratory
actions would unduly restrict the scope of the Florida declaratory judgments statute, FLA. STAT.
ch. 86 (1992). Id. at 1007. Although the same court had previously held that a declaratory action
was available only to settle the meaning of ambiguities in insurance policies, but not to resolve
questions of fact, Vanguard, 544 So. 2d at 1155, the Conde court rejected the earlier case: "This
interpretation limits Chapter 86 to little more than a codification of the parol evidence rule. Chap-
ter 86 should not be read so narrowly." Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1007. Thus, the court allowed the
declaratory judgment action to proceed in order to determine whether the shooting was intentional
or negligent.
171. 580 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see also Irvine, 630 So. 2d at 580 (agreeing with
Judge Sharp's separate opinion in Conde).
172. Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1010 (Sharp, J.); id. at 1011 (Diamantis, J.).
173. Id. at 1007 n.5.
174. Id.
175. See supra part I.A. for a discussion of the test for determining the duty to defend in
Florida.
176. 595 So. 2d at 1008.
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between plaintiff and insured would render the insured powerless to con-
trol the defense. The insurer must have a voice. "Otherwise, the insurer
must sit back and provide an attorney to 'defend' an insured by, in con-
cert with the plaintiff, establishing that what might be the most deliber-
ate shooting was, in fact, a negligent shooting."' 77
The Conde decision suggests that, for at least the limited type of
case involving mutually exclusive theories, the insurer should be able to
look beyond the pleadings to determine its duties. The court's interpre-
tation of chapter 86 of the Florida statutes, which allows determination
of questions of fact in declaratory judgment actions whether or not they
involve interpretation of a written document, is not limited to cases of
mutually exclusive theories.17 8 In fact, the statute requires that it be
"liberally administered and construed."'' 79  Courts should not limit its
effect.
E. Joinder of Parties in Declaratory Actions
If an insurer seeks an early declaration regarding insurance cover-
age, the injured party has an interest in the coverage case. One court has
suggested that, because of the danger of inconsistent adjudications, an
important factor in determining whether to let the declaratory judgment
action proceed before the underlying action is whether the plaintiff in the
underlying tort action has been joined.
8 0
Where the courts have allowed the declaratory action to proceed,
such as in Emery,' 8' Britamco,82 and Conde,"3 the third parties had
been joined. Conversely, where the courts have not permitted the
declaratory action to proceed, the plaintiffs in the underlying action were
not joined. Whether the joinder or lack of joinder is a major factor in
these decisions, however, is not clear.' 4 Where the declaratory actions
177. Id.
178. The language of the statute suggests no limitation. See supra note 97 for the text of
§ 86.011.
179. FLA. STAT. § 86.101 (1995). "This chapter is declared to be substantive and remedial. Its
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights,
status, and other equitable or legal relations and is to be liberally administered and construed."
ld. (emphasis added).
180. Home Ins. Co. v. Gephart, 639 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
181. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
182. Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Central Jersey Invs., Inc., 632 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994).
183. 595 So. 2d 1005.
184. The Emery court did not mention joinder as a factor in its decision. 579 So. 2d 798. In
Britamco, the court considered the joinder of the third party to be a positive, although not a
necessary factor in the court's decision. 632 So. 2d at 141.
If there are factual issues in the declaratory judgment action which are not common
to the liability action, there is no sound policy reason in this case for requiring the
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were not permitted, the courts did not specifically mention the lack of
joinder as a major factor in the decisions. 8 5 Only the Conde court con-
sidered it "essential" to join the injured parties. 8 6 The court stated that
joinder was necessary, because "If the declaratory judgment action
determines that the insured's conduct was intentional, then there would
no longer be a negligence action to defend."'
187
Some courts have expressed a concern with requiring all the parties
to be joined, because the insurance coverage action could become more
important than the underlying tort action. 8 There is a fear that the
insurance action will become the main action. This is not a problem,
however, but is the correct result. If the only substantial asset of the
tortfeasor is the insurance policy, then the insurance coverage action is
the main case and the law should treat it so.
IV. "DEEP POCKETS," EXCLUSIVE PLEADING, AND DECLARATORY
ACTIONS
In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.,"8 9 the insurer refused to defend
the insured because the underlying complaint alleged an intentional tort,
which was excluded under the policy.' 90 The California Supreme Court
held that an insured should be able to look beyond the pleadings to
determine whether the claim is covered, thus triggering the insurer's
duty to defend.' 9' In explaining its decision to part from the exclusive
pleading test, the court stated: "Defendant cannot construct a formal
fortress of the third party's pleadings and retreat behind its walls....
[W]e should hardly designate the third party as the arbiter of the policy's
coverage."'' 9 2 Current practice in Florida, however, continues to trap the
insurer to be precluded from litigating its coverage dispute with its insured,
especially when the plaintiff is also a party to the declaratory judgment action as
here.
d. (emphasis added).
185. Of course, those courts required the insurers to defend, and did not have to reach the
joinder issue. Irvine v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA
1993). In Irvine, however, the court specifically stated that it would not allow the insurer to use
the declaratory judgment action as a "mini trial" to resolve the coverage issues "without the
participation of the plaintiffs." Id. at 580.
186. 595 So. 2d at 1008.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., id. at 1011 (Diamantis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I must
respectfully dissent from the apparent effort of the majority to make the coverage issue the main
focus in situations where there is an independent tort action against an insured and a separate issue
concerning coverage.").
189. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) (in bank).
190. Id. at 170.
191. Id. at 176.
192. Id.
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insurer in the "formal fortress" of the injured party's complaint, by
applying the "exclusive pleading" test to determine the duty to defend.
Although Florida purports to rely upon the allegations of the com-
plaint to determine the insurer's duty to defend, 193 the courts tend to
read the allegations broadly to find coverage for the insured.' 94 By
enforcing the strict, mechanical exclusive pleading rule against insurers,
however, the courts preclude insurers from challenging bogus allega-
tions, thus encouraging fictional claims. This allows a plaintiff and
defendant to keep a claim within coverage even though the claim has no
basis in fact.' 95 A concurring judge in Conde addressed this problem
directly:
Given the undisputed facts of this case, absent considerations of
insurance . . ., it would never occur to a lawyer to plead this plainly
intentional tort as negligence .... I can see no good faith basis for
asserting a claim of negligence in this case, although I recognize it is
standard practice. The problem is that such a pleading creates a per-
fect conspiracy between a plaintiff and the insured and the insurer has
no remedy.
The plaintiff pleads negligence in a case like this because he
wants a deep pocket from which to satisfy a judgment or, even better,
to obtain a settlement.... An insured defendant is often totally com-
mitted to the negligence pleading of the plaintiff because as long as
the negligence claim is included in the complaint, the insured must be
provided a defense on the intentional tort claim, a benefit he would
not have if the spurious negligence claim were missing. It is also
more likely the insurer will come up with the money to settle the
entire case based on the cost of defending the negligence claim.'
96
If litigation is the search for truth, then courts should allow the truth to
be determined. Otherwise, by forcing insurers to undertake the expense
of defending claims which are outside of coverage, the law creates set-
tlement value in suits which otherwise would have none.' 97 When the
193. For a discussion of whether Florida actually follows this test, see supra part !.A.
194. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text, discussing cases in which the courts read
the pleadings expansively in favor of insureds.
195. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005, 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). This case is
discussed in more detail supra part III.D.
196. Id. at 1008-09 (Griffin, J., concurring); see also Marr Invs., Inc. v. Greco, 621 So. 2d 447,
449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ("It is wrong to require the insurance company to defend against facts
that are clearly not within the coverage of the policy, even though the 'complaint' may be.").
The "perfect conspiracy" between the insured-defendant and the injured party-plaintiff is
often reinforced by a close relationship, or by feelings of remorse between the parties. See, e.g.,
Conde, 595 So. 2d 1005 (de facto husband and father shot his wife and children); Spengler v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 568 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (boyfriend shot girlfriend
in case of mistaken identity).
197. There is an additional temptation for fraud in cases where an insured hires his own
counsel. One commentator hypothesized a case in which the complaint has accurately alleged a
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law does not allow insurers to determine the truth, and instead helps
injured parties to squeeze settlements from insurance companies for
claims clearly outside of coverage, then the law, in a sense, aids in
extortion.
Some who object to allowing coverage issues to be determined
before liability express concern that the insured will suffer. For exam-
ple, a dissenter in Conde worried that if the insurer could litigate cover-
age issues against its insured, it would "turn its back" on the tort action,
thus requiring the insured to pay for two lawsuits, "despite the insurance
policy, which guaranteed him at least one defense."' 98 But the insurance
policy did not, and for reasons of public policy could not, insure
Osvaldo Conde for shooting his wife and children. The insurer guaran-
teed a defense for covered claims, not for intentional acts.
Several courts have determined that public policy supports allowing
declaratory actions regarding insurance coverage, because the actions
inform the parties of their rights and prospects for recovery. In
Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Central Jersey Investments, Inc.,199 the
court stated:
Generally, an insurance carrier should be entitled to an expedi-
tious resolution of coverage where there are no significant, counter-
vailing considerations. A prompt determination of coverage
potentially benefits the insured, the insurer and the injured party. If
coverage is promptly determined, an insurance carrier is able to make
an intelligent judgment on whether to settle the claim. If the insurer
is precluded from having a good faith issue of coverage expeditiously
determined, this interferes with early settlement of claims. The plain-
tiff certainly benefits from a resolution of coverage in favor of the
insured. On the other hand, if coverage does not exist, the plaintiff
may choose to cut losses by not continuing to litigate against a
defendant who lacks insurance coverage.200
Another concern with allowing insurers to determine coverage
issues in declaratory actions before liability is decided is that insurers
will challenge every claim. Several practicalities, however, would pre-
clearly intentional shooting, and the insured tortfeasor retained his own attorney. If the insured
has no assets, the defense attorney may be tempted to call the plaintiff's attorney and suggest "an
amended complaint substituting an allegation of negligence for the allegation of intentional
shooting, or adding such an allegation as an alternative claim." This would bring coverage, and
would pay the attorney's fees. J. Patrick Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment
Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
18, 27 (1975).
198. Conde, 595 So. 2d at 1010 (Sharp, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
199. 632 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
200. Id. at 141.
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vent any wave of declaratory judgment actions.2 °1 One reason is
expense, especially if the insurer is also paying for the insured's defense
while the declaratory judgment action proceeds-as would happen if the
insurer defends under a reservation of rights. The main reason insurers
will not challenge every claim is related to business, not law. Insurers
realize that when they bring an action against their own insured, they
will likely lose that customer forever. From a marketing perspective,
declaratory judgment actions brought against the insured destroy good-
will. 20 2 Thus, allowing the insurer to challenge sham pleadings before
liability is determined should not result in insurers challenging every
case.
Victim compensation is another argument against allowing insurers
to bring an early declaratory action, because allowing an action might
decrease an insurer's incentive to settle.20 3 Judge Keeton has said,
"[L]iability insurance has come to be used openly and extensively as a
device for insuring compensation to victims." 2" In one Florida sexual
205 whcabuse case, in which the court held that the molester did not "inten-
tionally" harm his granddaughter when he fondled her, the court
attempted to justify its decision in part by stating, "[A] conclusion in this
insurance coverage case that there may be insurance coverage as com-
pensation for injuries inflicted by the insured which the premiums
received by the insurers were paid to provide for would, however inci-
dentally, be consistent with the interests of the child."2" The problem
with this rationale is that it treats insurance companies as public utilities
established to promote the general welfare, when they are private com-
panies that contractually agree to protect the insured for risks covered by
the policy. Insurance companies spread risk, and cannot do so effi-
ciently when they are required to pay for risks they have not agreed to
cover. Public policy precludes anyone from insuring themselves against
a loss he may face as a result of sexually abusing a child, or intentionally
shooting his family. Yet by considering victim compensation as an
important function of liability insurance, and therefore precluding the
insurance company from challenging the claims made, the system, in
effect, allows insurance for these activities.20 7
201. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text for discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages to an insurer of filing a declaratory judgment action against its insured.
202. See Treece & Hall, supra note 85; Ericsson, supra note 88.
203. See supra notes 195-197 and accompanying text, discussing the increased value given to
lawsuits seeking excluded claims when insurers cannot challenge the pleadings.
204. KEETON, supra note 27, at 233.
205. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
206. Id. at 613.




The present state of the law requires insurers to defend lawsuits
which fall outside of coverage and are brought only to reach into the
insurer's deep pocket. For the insurance system to function efficiently,
it must function openly, so that insurers and insureds can determine their
rights and duties under their policies. The system cannot function well
where plaintiffs are permitted, even encouraged, to artfully plead their
cases into coverage, and the insurer has no mechanism for determining
the truth.
This Comment proposes a rule which would increase the efficacy
of the declaratory judgment action as a tool for resolving insurance cov-
erage disputes. The proposed rule certainly would not eliminate "nui-
sance" lawsuits, but it should decrease the number of claims based on
insupportable factual allegations. This Comment proposes: that all par-
ties should be entitled to have purely factual questions which affect legal
rights determined in a declaratory action; that insurers should be permit-
ted to determine coverage issues by declaratory judgment at any stage in
the liability action; that in such early declaratory actions insurers should
be permitted to determine questions common to both coverage and lia-
bility actions; and that the injured party should be permitted, but not
required, to join in the coverage action. This Comment also proposes
that the courts discard the "exclusive pleading" test, and allow the courts
to determine the true facts of a claim, rather than encourage fictionalized
allegations to trigger coverage.
VI. PROPOSAL
This Proposal addresses three issues regarding the use of declara-
tory judgment actions in liability cases in Florida: whether to allow
courts to determine questions of fact in declaratory proceedings, whether
to allow coverage issues to be determined before liability has been
decided, and whether questions common to the coverage and liability
actions are subject to declaratory judgment.
Questions of Fact. Declaratory actions should be available to
resolve questions of fact in insurance cases.
There is no basis in the Florida declaratory judgments statute for
refusing to resolve such questions. On the contrary, the statute clearly
provides for the determination of questions of fact: section 86.011
grants jurisdiction to trial courts,2 °8 section 86.051 specifies that none of
liability. Where insurance is mandated, there is a much stronger argument that victim
compensation is part of the public policy.
208. FLA. STAT. § 86.10 (1995); see supra note 97 for relevant text.
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the enumerations provided for in the statute are exclusive,2 °9 section
86.071 provides for jury trials to determine factual issues in declaratory
actions,210 and section 86.101 provides that the statute is to be "liberally
administered and construed."2 1
The case of Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman,21 2 which
appears to have been decided either specific to its pleadings, or based on
an understanding of the prior, more restrictive Florida statute on declara-
tory judgments, should be overruled as contrary to the remedial purpose
of Chapter 86. There is no sound policy reason to treat factual and legal
questions differently for purposes of declaratory judgments.
Declaratory Judgment before Liability. Insurers should not be
forced to defer an adjudication of coverage issues until the end of the
liability trial.
Deferral of coverage issues harms the insurer, who must wait until
the underlying action is complete, then presumably refuse to indemnify,
and eventually face another lawsuit. Deferral also harms the plaintiff,
who may be suing a defendant whose only asset is insurance coverage.
The plaintiff would be better off knowing that insurance coverage is not
available before undertaking the time and expense of the underlying liti-
gation. Further, the insured cannot complain of not receiving a defense
if the claims are not covered or if he has engaged in excluded activity.
The injured party's complaint should not give the insured more
coverage than he had originally purchased. Requiring the insurer to
defend claims outside of coverage based on manufactured pleadings
allows the plaintiff and the defendant insured to receive benefits they
would not otherwise enjoy. If the insurer cannot bring a declaratory
judgment action to determine the nature of its duties, it faces the possi-
bility of providing a defense in a trial, yet having no forum in which to
challenge bogus allegations. Faced with an expensive defense of the tort
action, the insurer will often offer a settlement even though the case is
not covered.
Rather than force the insurer to make decisions based on the artful-
ness of the third party's complaint, courts should allow declaratory judg-
ment actions to go forward, so that all parties will be able to make fully
informed and rational decisions on litigation and settlement.
Questions Common to Coverage and Liability. Questions common
to both liability and coverage actions should be capable of determina-
209. FLA. STAT. § 86.051 (1995); see supra note 101 for relevant text.
210. FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1995).
211. FLA. STAT. § 86.101 (1995).
212. 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952).
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tion in a declaratory action, but findings made in the coverage action
should not bind the insured in the liability action.
It wotild be inequitable to force insureds to defend themselves in a
declaratory action over coverage, and then to bind the insured by any
negative findings made in the coverage action in the liability action.
Some courts have held that insurers may not bring declaratory actions
regarding coverage if the questions to be determined are common to
both coverage and liability.2 13 However, this "solution" deprives the
insurer of any forum in which to determine its rights. Such a harsh rule
is not necessary.
The courts should fashion a rule limiting issue preclusion between
the coverage and liability suits, so that the insured is not bound in the
liability action by the findings in the coverage action. One court
adopted this approach, holding "intent" in a wrongful death action is not
the same issue as "intent" for purposes of the intentional act exclu-
sion.214 This allowed the insurer to determine its coverage obligations,
but without binding the parties in the tort action. This approach allows
the declaratory action to proceed on the coverage issue to determine the
rights of the insured and insurer vis-a-vis each other, but independently
of the injured party. The decision would be final as to coverage, but the
injured party would then be free to pursue any liability action against the
insured, whether coverage exists or not.
Some may argue that this rule is unfair because the coverage action
may show that there is no insurance coverage, and the injured party
would then simply abandon the liability action. This is precisely the
correct result, though, if the goal of the liability action is to gain any
possible insurance proceeds. Certainly it is better for the injured party to
learn the truth earlier, rather than later, in the litigation.
Joinder. The injured party must be permitted to join in the cover-
age action, but must not be required to join.
Although some cases have suggested that a declaratory action
should only proceed if the injured party is joined as a defendant,215 this
rule is only necessary if the rights of the injured party are being adjudi-
cated. If the findings in the coverage action are not binding in the liabil-
ity action, as suggested in this Proposal, it would not be necessary to
join the injured party in the coverage action.
The injured party must be allowed to join the coverage action, how-
ever, or there would be a danger of collusion between the insurer and the
insured. If the injured party were precluded from joining, the insurer
213. See, e.g., Marr Invs., Inc. v. Greco, 621 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
214. Smith v. North River Ins. Co., 360 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 1978).
215. See supra part III.E. for a discussion of joinder issues.
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and insured would have their own potential "perfect conspiracy." They
could simply seek a determination that there is no insurance coverage,
thus making the liability action worthless for the injured party, who
might then drop the suit. The conflict thus established would mirror that
created by the exclusive pleading rule and the present law regarding
declaratory actions.
GREGOR J. SCHWINGHAMMER, JR.*
* The author is indebted to Professor Tom Baker of the University of Miami for his
invaluable advice on this Comment, and thanks Professor Baker for his service as advisor to the
Law Review, without which the year would not have been so successful.
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